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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS

This is an appeal from a jury verdict finding Appellant
guilty of disorderly conduct contrary to Logan City
Ordinance 12/8/9.

The appeal is taken to the Utah Court of

Appeals from the Second Circuit Court, Cache County, Logan
City Department pursuant to Rule 26 of the Utah Code of
Criminal Procedure title 77, chapter 35.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED

1)

Whether or not Logan City Ordinance 12/8/9

violates Article 1 § 15 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States of America.
2)

Whether or not Logan City Ordinance 12/8/9 is

unconstitutional vague as applied.
3)

Whether or not the Court properly and adequately

instructed the jury.
4)

Whether or not the Court in admonishing the

Appellant before the jury committed harmless error.

i

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On December 11, 1988 at approximately 1:30 am (T.25 In
24-35, T. 26 In. 1-5), officers observed a small car make a
wide turn and start to side slip in some small pea gravel
then accelerate very rapidly to a speed extimated to be
between thirty-five to thirty-eight miles per hour (T.32 In
4-9).

When within a position about ten to fifteen feet in

front of the police vehicle, the suspect vehicle braked and
stopped at a traffic semaphore on Third North and Main
Street in Logan City.

The officers pulled their car behind

the suspect vehicle and followed it through the semaphore.
At which time, the officers activated their lights and
suspect vehicle pulled over into a parking lot of a local
business (T. 27-28).

The officers pulled behind the suspect

vehicle; and the Appellant exited his vehicle and walked up
to the door of the business.

One of the officers called to

Appellant indicating that they needed to talk with him (T.
38-39) . Another officer asked how the Appellant was and the
Appellant responded, "Not very good"

(T. 4 0 In A) . The

officer then inquired what the problem was. The Appellant
responded, "You guys are on my private property, you have no
reason for being here, you're trespassing"
13-14).
git".

(T. 40 In

Appellant stepped toward the officer and said, "Now
The officer then asked Appellant for his driver's

o

license, and Defendant responded, "Fuck you, I'm not going
to give it to you"

(T. 40 In 24-25).

All the officer

wanted was Appellant's drivers license and registration, and
to talk with him for a minute about his driving.

The

officer was trying to determine if he had been drinking or
not (T. 41 In 7-11).
The officer continued to ask for Appellant's license
with Appellant responding, "Fuck you" and "This is bullshit".

Appellant continued to refuse to get his drivers

license.
The situation got progressively worse and was
deteriorating.

It was becoming a fight (T. 82 In 16-25).

Appellant was yelling at the officer face-to-face with the
officer backing away trying to disfuse the situation.
Appellant was becoming violent.

The officer was in danger

(T. 84 In 9-12) .
The following is a transcript of

part of the con-

versation that ensued between the officers and Appellant
introduced into evidence at trial as Exhibit D-l (T. 85-93)
Huber:

... You're two blocks down the road.

Monroe:

We weren't two blocks down the road.

Huber:

You were clear the hell down by Taco Time.

Monroe:

Do you want to know where we really were? When you
came around the corner, when you came around the
corner awfully fast, right at the road here, we were
parked just off the road. But we do need to see
your driver's license.

Huber:

...This is my property and your on it without my
permission and that's it that's what it boils down
to. If it ... I'm tired of being harrassed.

Monroe:

We need to see your registration too please.

Huber:

Bull shit I How you'r,e on my property this is my
building, I haven't done anything wrong, I want to
be left alone. I'm get tired of this harrassment,
because I come out of my bar and you guys start
harrassing, and I don't want it.

Monroe:

We need to see your driver's license, and the
registration.

Huber:

The registration is current it's on the back,
you're going to run it through the radio, you can
find out just as quick as I can.

Monroe:

Look, Mr. Huber, we are trying to be decent here.

Huber:

No, you're not, why you pull me over.

Monroe:

As we said, you're going too fast.

Huber:

No it's because, what time is it, because you have
nothing else to do. And that's it.

Monroe:

In just about 2 seconds, we're not going to be
decent okay. We need to see the registration.

Huber:

Fine, fine, fine.

Monroe:

We'll be with you in just a second.

Huber:

This is a bunch of crap, you know the car it it's
mine, it's always here. Get your fuckin1 light
out of my car, goddamnit. You guys piss me right
off.

Monroe:

Here's the deal Mr. Huber, you are under arrest
for disorderly conduct. We are going to jail.
Put your hands behind your back. Turn around and
put your hands behind your back.

Huber:

What is the deal here?

Monroe:

You're under arrest.

Huber:

For what? For what? Hold your horses let me put
my keys in my pocket.
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Get your lights out...

Monroe:

Okay we'll do that.

Huber:

...turn my car off, can I turn my car off.

Monroe:

Not now.

Huber:

Wait a minute, can I call my attorney right now?
This is stupider than hell. You guys really wanna
go for this....You wit around there and ... my car
for no reason what so ever.

Roper:

Are they too tight

Huber:

That one!s way too tight

Roper:

Would you like me to loosen them a little bit for
ya.

Huber:

I'd like not to be wearing them...hello can you
explain to me why these guys are pulling this
stunt.

Geier:

I don't know yet, but I'll find out. Mr. Huber
you're under arrest for...

Huber:

I'm on my own property, ...I get mad at them
because...in my car, there is absolutely no reason
for this... my own private property, this is my
property, you agree you're on my property
he
knows me personally.

Roper:

I don't know you.

Huber:
Monroe:

Well he does.
Mr. Huber, I've seen you one time okay. (To
Geier-away from Huber)...he was going 20-25 mph
going around the corner, visually between 35-38
mph coming down the road here. He thinks we're
clear up the road, here, we were sitting right
here watching the house. He comes around the
corner visually 35-38 mph we stopped him, he jumps
out and just goes bananas. Re won't give us the
drivers license he's telling us, fuck you, goddamn
you, fuck you, and all this so we...I don't smell
nothing.

Geier:

Sounds good to me.

Monroe:

Yea, he's going to jail.

Geier:

Would you like your car left here on your own
personal property?

Huber:

Yes, I'd like me left here.

Defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct and
transported to jail.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

1.

THE LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE PROPERLY
CONSTRUED DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I SECTION 15 OF THE
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION.

2.

LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE IS NOT
OVERBROAD NOR CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED
TO THIS DEFENDANT.

3.

THE JURY WAS PROPERLY AND ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED
BY THE COURT.

4.

THE COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH THE
ELEMENTS OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT.

5.

THE COURT PROPERLY ADMONISHED APPELLANT NOT TO
MAKE GESTURES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.
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ARGUMENT

1

THE LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE
PROPERLY CONSTRUED DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE I
SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION OR
THE FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

The Appellant alleging the unconstitutionality of the
Logan City Disorderly Conduct Statute must overcome three
hurdles:
1)

The ordinance is presumed to be valid and

in conformity with the Constitution.
Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. 21 Utah 2d
431, 446 P.2d S58 (1968); Greaves v. State 528 P.2d 805
(Utah 1974) .
2)

The statute or ordinance should not be

invalid unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision
Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421 (Alaska 1969).

3)

The burden of showing invalidity of the

ordinance is upon the Appellant.
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d
561, 563 (1952), it was recognized
that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional
if there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be
sustained as falling within the constitutional framework, and that a statute will not be held void for
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect
may be given.
In fact, it is the established policy of the Utah
Supreme Court to construe statutory provisions whenever
possible in a way to avoid invalidating them on
constitutional grounds.

Greaves v. State, supra.

For example, in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1260
(Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court imposed the requirement
that juries be instructed to find that previous crimes of
the defendant which have not resulted in convictions,
introduced at a penalty phase, be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
In State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 83-84 (Utah), cert,
denied, 459 US 988, 103 S. Ct 341, 74 L. Ed 2d 383 (1982),
the Utah Supreme Court construed Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended) §76-3-207 to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt at the penalty phase of a capital case that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, even though no specific burden of persuasion
was provided in the statute.

8

In Re Criminal Investigation, 7th District Court No.
Cs-1, 754 P.2d 633, 640-41 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme
Court went to great lengths to save the constitutionality of
the Subpoena Powers Act by reading into it a host of new
provisions which simply were next put in by the Legislature.
However, in Provo City Corporation v. Willden, 100 Utah
Adv. Rep. 7 (1989), the Utah Supreme Court found Provo
City's soliciting sexual conduct ordinance unconstitutional
as a violation of the freedom of speech clause of the first
amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Court

noted that the city might have forbid the Defendant's
conduct therein by a properly worded ordinance.
In fact, State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280 Utah (1983),
the Utah Supreme Court held that a Utah statute prohibiting
production of visual recordings depicting minors engaging in
sexual or simulated sexual conduct was not subject to attack
on First Amendment grounds, in that conduct prohibited was
not pure speech.
Our fundamental interest in free speech demands the
existence of a compelling government interest to justify
legislative restriction upon it.
For example, in Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S. Ct 733, 21 L.
Ed 2d 731 (1969) , students wore black armbands to school to

publicize their objections to the Vietnam War despite the
fact that they were aware that the school authorities a few
days previously had adopted a policy or regulation any
student wearing an armband to school would be asked to
remove it, and if he refused would be suspended until he
returned without the armband.

The authorities had no reason

to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would
substantially interfere with the work of the school or
impinge upon the rights of other students.

It was held that

the wearing of armbands in the circumstances of the case was
entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive
conduct by those participating in it, and as such was
closely akin to "pure speech" which was entitled to
protection under the First Amendment.
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 435 US 829, 98 S. Ct 1535, 56 L. Ed 2d 1 (1978)
held that the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and press did not permit the criminal punishment of
the news media, who were nonparticipants in the commission's
confidential proceedings.

Although the Virginia criminal

statute did not violate the Constitution, it could not
constitutionally be extended to punish a newspaper.

10

In Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct 2023 (1982), the
ordinance was expressly directed at commercial activity
promoting or encouraging illegal drug use.

If that activity

is deemed "speech", then it is speech proposing an illegal
transaction which a government may regulate or ban entirely.
A compelling government

interest has been found to

exist in the prohibition of fighting words - words which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an
immediate breach of the peace do not enjoy constitutional
protection. Chaplinsky vs. New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 62 S.
Ct 766, 86 L. Ed 1031 (1942).
There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any
constitutional problem. These include
the lewd and obscene, the profane, the
libelous, and the insulting or
'fighting1 words - those which by their
very utterance induce injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.
It has been well observed that such
utterances are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly out weighed by the
social interest in order, and morality.
Chaplinsky, supra at 571-572.
In order to uphold the constitutionality of a state
statute or ordinance under which the prosecution attempts to

punish the utterance of "fighting words", such statute or
ordinance must, by its own terms or as construed by the
statefs court, be limited in its application to "fighting
words" and must not be susceptible of application to speech
that is protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments to
the Constitution. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra.
Affirming the defendant's conviction under a state
statute prohibiting any person.from addressing "any
offensive, devisive or annoying words to any other person
lawfully in any street or other public place, for calling a
police officer a "Goddamned rackateer" and a "dammed
fascist", the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, supra, rejected the defendant's contention
that the statute deprived him of his right of freedom, of
speech guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Noting

that the statute, as construed by the state's highest court,
merely prohibited face-to-face words plainly likely to cause
a breach of the peace and did not contravene the
constitutional right of free expression.

The statute was

narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific
conduct lying within the domain of state power, namely, the
use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of
the peace.

A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn

so as not unduly to impair liberty of expression is not too
vaque for a criminal law.

12

In Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15f 91 S. Ct 1780, 29
L. Ed 2d 284 (1971) , it was held that merely offensive or
vulgar language alone could not be punished.

In this case,

the defendant did net engage in nor threaten to engage inf
nor did anyone as the result of his conduct in fact commit
or threaten to commit any act of violence.

The defendant

did not make any loud or unusual noise, nor was there any
evidence that he uttered any sound prior to his arrest,
Defendant just wore a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft".
Later, in Gooding v. Wilson, 405 US 518, 92 S. Ct 1103,
31 L. Ed 2d 4C8 (1972) , the Supreme Court defined the
necessary characteristics of statutes or ordinances
proscribing the use of offensive words in public if such
legislation is to pass constitutional muster.

Enactments

punishing the use of words or language must be carefully
drawn or authoritatively construed to punish only
unprotected speech and must not be susceptible of
application to speech protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Thus, a state's attempt to proscribe behavior amounting
tc a breach of the peace or disorderly conduct must punish
"fighting words" and must do so in such a wasy as to avoid
infringing at the same time upon constitutionally protected
speech.

13

The important underlying aspect of these cases goes
really to the function of lav/ in preserving ordered liberty.
Civilized people refrain from "taking the law into their own
hands".
It is a little over a century since men use to carry
guns constantly because the law did not afford protection.
In that setting, words directed toward such an armed
civilianr could well have led to death or serious bodily
injury.

When we undermine the general belief that the law

will give protection against fighting words and profane and
abusive language such as the utterances involved in the case
at hand, we take steps to return to law of jungle.

In

short, we erode public confidence in the law - that subtle
but indispensable ingredient of ordered liberty.
In State v. Chima, 23 Utah 2d 360, 463 P. 2d 802
(1970) , a statute providing that every person who, without
authority of law, wilfully disturbs or breaks up any
assembly or meeting, not unlawful in its character, is not
unconstitutional.

The fact that a speaker at a public

meeting shouted back at defendants did not render
unconstitutional the application to defendant of the
statute.

In this case, defendants claimed their right of

free speech took precedence over another's right to free
assembly.

14

The Logan City Disorderly Conduct ordinances provides:
A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(1) He refuses to comply withe the
lawful order of the police to move from
a public place, or knowingly creates a
hazardous or physically offensive
condition, by any act which serves no
legitimate purpose; or
(2) Intending to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, or
recklessy creating a risk thereof:
(A) Ke engages in fighting or in
violent, tumultuous,
or threatening behavior; or
(B) He makes unreasonable noises
in a public place; or
(C) He makes unreasonable noises
in a private place
which can be heard in a public
place; or
(D) He engages in abuse or obscene
language or makes obscene gestures in a
public place; or
(E) He obstructs vehicular or
pedestrian traffic.
(b) "Public place", for the
purpose of this section, means any place
to which the public or a substantia]
group of the public has access and
includes but is net limited to streets,
highways, and the common areas of
schools, hospitals, apartment houses f

office buildings, transport facilities
and shops.
(c) Disorderly conduct is a class
C misdemeanor if the offense continues
after a request by a person to desist.
Otherwise it is an infraction."

Disorderly conduct as defined by the Ordinance is net
necessarily verbal alone.

However, the information herein

alleged that Appellant violated the above statute as
follows:

15

"COUNT 1: That the Defendant did intend
to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly
created a risk thereof by engaging in
abusive cr obscene language cr made
obscene gestures in a public place."
The exception to First Amendment protection recogni
in Chaplinsky, supra, is not limited to words whose mere
utterance entails a high probability of an outbreak of
physical violence.

It also extends tc the willful use o

language calculated to offend the sensibilities of an
unwilling audience.
In

KillJams v. District of Columbia, 419 F. 2d 628,

646, (CAEC 1969), this issue was explicitly addressed:
Z^part from punishing profane or obscene
words which are spoken in circumstances
which create a threat of violence, the
State may also have a legitimate
interest in stopping one person from
inflicting injury en others by verbally
assaulting them with language which is
grossly offensive because of its profane
or cbscene character. The fact that a
person may constitutionally indulge his
taste for obscenities in private does
not mean that he is tree to intrude them
upon the attentions of others.
...a breach of the peace is threatened
either because the language creates a
substantial risk of provoking violence,
or because it is, under "contemporary
community standards," so crossly
offensive to members of the public who
actually overbear it as to amount to
nuisance.
Clearly the Logan City ordinance can be construed a
constitutional under such reasonmc.

Furthermore, in the present situation, the Appellant
was stopped and asked to produce his driver's license (T. 40
Appellant responded, "Fuck you, Ifm not going to

In 22-23).

give it to you" (T. 40 In 25). Appellant continued yelling
and shouting at the officers, "Fuck you"; "This is bullshit"
and the like (T. 41 In. 18). The officer was facing the
Appellant with the Appellant moving closer to the officer
and the officer backing away (T. 42 In 3-12).

The situation

was becoming violent and a fight was iminent (T. 84 In
9-12).
At the very least, these are fighting words under
Chaplinsky, supra, especially in light of Appellant's non
verbal as well as verbal conduct.

The conduct of the

Appellant clearly was not constitutionally protected.
Furthermore, the actions cf the Appellant clearly were not
constitutionally protected.
An ordinance similar to the one herein was fcund tc be
constitutional in Cottage Grove v. Farr, 42 OR. App. 21, 599
P. 2d 472 (1979) .

The ordinance read in part as fellows:

"A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct if, with intent to cause
public convenience, annoyance or alarm,
he:
*

»»*

*

(c) Uses abusive cr obscene language,
or makes an obscene gesture, in a public
place; or
»

*

*

*

(h) Created a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act which he
is not licensed or privileged to do*"
Id at 473.

2
LOGAN CITY DISORDERLY CONDUCT ORDINANCE IS NOT OVERBROAD NOR
CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS APPLIED TO THIS DEFENDANT

In construing the constitutionality of a statute or
ordinance, a court should construe law so as to carry out
the legislative intent while avoiding constitutional conflicts.
In Re A Criminal Investigation Seventh District Court Number
CS-1, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988) An ordinance or statute will
net be declared unconstitutional on account of vagueness if
under any sensible interpretation of its language it can be
given practical effect.

Greaves v. State, 528 P.2d 803

(Utah 1974) .
In ascertaining the constitutionality of a statute cr
ordinance as previously noted, the following rules cf
construction should be applied:
1)

A Legislative enactment is presumed to be

valid and in conformity with the constitution.

Trade

Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc. 21 Utah 2d 431, 4 46
P.2d 958 (1968); Greaves v. State, supra.
2)

The statute or ordinance should not be

invalid unless it ir shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be
incompatible with some particular constitutional provision
Killer v. State, 462 F.2d 421 (Alaska 1969).

ia

3)

The burden of showing invalidity of an

ordinance or statute is upon the one who makes the challenge
Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, supra.
In State v. Packard, 122 Utah 369, 373, 250 P.2d 561,
563 (1952), it was recognized
that statutes should not be declared unconstitutional
if there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be
sustained as falling within the constitutional framework, and that a statute will not be held void for
uncertainty if any sort of sensible, practical effect
may be given.
In determining whether or not a statute or ordinance is
vague, it must be sufficiently definite
(1)

To inform persons of ordinary intelligence,

who would be law abiding, what their conduct must be to
conform to its requirements,
(2)

To advise a defendant accused of violating it

just what constitutes the offense with which he or she is
charged, and
(3)

To be susceptible of uniform interpretation

and application by those charged with responsibility of
apply and enforcing it.

State v. Packard, supra, Greaves v.

State, supra, State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182 (Utah, 1981).
On the other hand, a criminal statute is not rendered
unconstitutional by the fact that its application may be
uncertain in exceptional cases, so long as the general area
of conduct against which legislation is directed is made
plain. See 21 Am Jur. 2d, Criminal Law §17.

The ordinance herein states with sufficient clarity and
conciseness the elements necessary to constitute a
violation:
1)

a defendant refuses to comply with the lawful

order of the police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition, by
any act which serves no legitimate purpose; or
2)

Defendant intends to cause a public

inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm or recklessly creates a
risk thereof:
a)

engages in fighting or in violent,

tumultuous or threatening behavior; or
b)

makes unreasonable noises in a public

c)

engages in abusive or obscene language

place; or

or makes obscene gestures in a public place•
Taking all the elements into account, the crime specifically defines the outer permieters of conduct.

In order to

violate the ordinance, the above elements must exist.
In Cottage Grove v. Farr, 42 Or. App. 21, 599 P.2d 472,
473 (1979) , a local ordinance similar to the ordinance in
question declaring that
"A person commits the crime of disorderly conduct if, v/ith intent to cause
public convenience, annoyance or alarm,
he:

«*

*

*

(c) Uses abusive or obscene language,
or makes an obscene gesture, in a public
place; or
" * * *

(h) Created a hazardous or physically
offensive condition by any act which he
is not licensed or privileged to do."
was found to be constitutional.
In

State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982) the Utah

Supreme Court found the Utah Statute prohibiting interfering
with a public servant (Utah Code Annotated (1953) as amended) §76-8-301) not to be unconstitutionally vague.

In this

case, defendant was stopped at a road block and requested to
produce his driver's license and vehicle registration.
Defendant angrily asked why he had to go through the process
because he had been stopped earlier that day.

Defendant

flashed the requested document at the officer, but the
officer was unable to adequately review the documents so he
then asked to see them again.

Defendant refused, and

defendant was then ordered cut of his truck.

Defendant got

out and clenching his fists, made threatening moves toward
the officer.

Defendant was arrested then for interfering

with a public servant.
Affirming defendant's conviction under a state statute
prohibiting any person from addressing "any offensive,
devisive or annoying words to any other person lawfully in
any street or public place", for calling a police officer a
"God damned racketeer" and a "damned fascist", the United
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States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US
563, 62 S. Ct 166r 86 L. Ed 1033,(1042),

rejected the

defendant's argument that the statute was so vague and
indefinite as to render a conviction thereunder a violation
of due process.

The Court said that the statute was narrow-

ly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct
lying within the domain of state power, namely, the use in a
public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace,
A statute punishing verbal acts, carefully drawn so as not
unduly impair liberty of expression is not too vague for a
criminal law.
Now look at the facts of the cases cited by Appellant
in support of his argument.
Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 93 S. Ct
970, 39 L. Ed 2d 214 (1974) held an ordinance unconstitutonal that made it unlawful as a breach of the peace "for any
person wantonly to curse or revile or to use obscene or
opprobrious language toward or with reference to " a city
policemen while in the actual performance of his duties. It
was held unconstitutional where the state courts had not
construed the statute as being limited to "fighting words"
which by their very utterance narrowly defined the words of
the ordinance so as to limit its application to "fighting
words".

Arguably the statute would have been

constitutionally upheld if the state courts had construed
the statutes as being limited to "fighting words".

Oratowski v. Civil Service Commission of City of
Chicago, 3 111 App. 2d 551, 123 N.E. 2d 146 (1954), involved
an administrative review of a police officer's action when
after being called an "ignorant jerk" because a squad car
was parked in a no parking zone, the officer arrested a
indignant motorist who had just received a ticket for
illegal parking for disorderly conduct.

There was consider-

able evidence of physical injury to the motorist in the
course of the arrest.

This was probably been why the court

noted that "an officer of the law must exercise the greatest
degree of restraint in dealing with the public.

He must not

conceive that every threatening or insulting word, gesture,
or motion amounts to disorderly conduct."
at 151.

Oratowski, supra,

The present case is a criminal case not an

administrative case, and there is no evidence of physical
injury to the Appellant as e result of the arrest.
In State v. John W, 418 A2d 1097, 14 ALR 4th 1238 (Me.
1980),

the defendant screamed at the officer, "Hey, turn

around and come back here" and "Hey, you fucking pig, ycu
fucking kangaroo."

The officer then ordered defendant to

get back into his car.

Defendant yelled, "Fuck you". Then

defendant was arrested for disorderly conduct.

This case

involved no face-to-face confrontation and only verbal
conduct.

In fact, the court noted in State v. John W, supra at
1245 that the United States Supreme Court in Chaplinsky,
supra, contemplated
"That courts enforcing disorderly
conduct statutes must look at the actual
situation in which the words were used,
in order to punish only words which,
when they were used were fplainly
likely1 to cause a breach of the peace.
In particular, the fact finder must
consider those personal attributes of
the addressee which reasonable apparent
because those attributes are a part of
the objective situation in which the
conduct occurred (emphasis added).
Norwell v. Cincinnati, 414 US 14, 94 S. Ct 187, 38 L.
Ed 2d 170,

(1973) held application of the disorderly

conduct ordinance violated Defendant's constitutionally
protected right of speech because he had been arrested and
convicted merely because of his verbal protest of the
officer's treatment of him and not because of his physical
acts.
Finally, Papish v. The Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, et al 410 US 667, 93 S. Ct 1197, 35 L.
Ed 2d 618, ren den 411 US 960,

93 S. Ct 1921, 36 L. Ed 2d

419, (1973) involved the dismissal of a student by a
university which is not the case herein.
As Justice Jackson dissenting in Saia v. New York, 334
US 558 571,

68 S. Ct 1148, 92 L. Ed 1574, (1948) warned of

the pitfalls of the kind of constitutional analysis Appellant is requesting herein

O A

But I did not suppose our function was
that of a council of revision. The
issue before us is whether what has been
done has deprived this appellant of a
constitutional right* It is the law as
applied that we review, not the abstract , academic questions which it
might raise in some more doubtful case.
(Emphasis added)
In the instance case, the officer stopped Appellant
based upon their observation of a vehicle making a wide
turn, getting into some small pea gravel and starting to
slide along with rapid accelaration (T. 28 In 1-8). The
officers were working on a specific detail, alcohol enforcement (T. 41 In 9-11).
The Appellant was stopped and asked to produce his
driver's license (T. 40 In 22-23).

Appellant responded,

"Fuck you, I'm not going to give it to you" (T. 40 In 25).
Appellant continued yelling and shouting at the officers,
"Fuck you"; "This is bullshit" and the like (T. 41 In. 18).
The officer was facing the Appellant with the Appellant
moving closer to the officer and the officer backing away
(T. 42 In 3-12).

Much of the conversation was recorded and

is contined herein in the Statement of Facts. But just as
important as the language of "Fuck you", "Bullshit", "Goddamn", "Hell" and "Piss me off" (T. 97-100), is the manner
in which Appellant spoke the words and his conduct.

Officer

Monroe testified that the situation was becoming so violent,
he felt that there was going to be a fight. Officer Roper

was in danger (T. 84 In 9-12).

In addition there is

reference to Appellant clenching his fists and struggling
until the handcuffs were put on him (T. 115 In 20-25 to T.
116 In 1-3)•

In light of the facts herein, Logan City Disorderly
Conduct Ordinance is not overbroad nor unconstitutionally
vague as applied to Appellant.

3
THE JURY WAS PROPERLY AND
ADEQUATELY INSTRUCTED BY THE COURT

Appellant in his brief cites no authority for the
proposition that the Court was bound upon giving jury
instruction number 2 or 3 to modify or explain the instruction in light of the requrired elements of "fighting words"
and "clear and present danger".
Furthermore, any error that may have occurred by
failure of the Court to explain fighting words and clear and
present danger was harmless error in light of the facts of
this case.

See cases on harmless error set forth in point 5

below.
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In the instance case, the officer stopped Appellant
based upon their observation of a vehicle making a wide
turn, getting into some small pea gravel and starting to
slide along with rapid accelaration (T. 28 In 1-8). The
officers were working on a specific detail, alcohol enforcement (T. 41 In 9-11).
The Appellant was stopped and asked to produce his
driver's license (T. 40 In 22-23)•

Appellant responded,

"Fuck you, I'm not going to give it to you" (T. 40 In 25).
Appellant continued yelling and shouting at the officers,
"Fuck you"; "This is bullshit" and the like (T. 41 In. 18).
The officer was facing the Appellant with the Appellant
moving closer to the officer and the officer backing away
(T. 42 In 3-12) . Much of the conversation was recorded and
is contined herein in the Statement of Facts. But just as
important as the language of "Fuck you", "Bullshit", "Goddamn", "Hell" and "Piss me off" (T. 97-100), is the manner
in which Appellant spoke the words and his conduct.

Officer

Monroe testified that the situation was becoming so violent,
he felt that there was going to be a fight, Officer Roper
was in danger (T. 84 In 9-12).

In addition there is

reference to Appellant clenching his fists and struggling
until the handcuffs were put on him (T. 115 In 20-25 to T.
116 In 1-3).

Appellant's words were definitely fighting words as
defined in Chaplinskyf supra - words which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of peace, and there was a clear and present danger to
officer Roper,

4

THE COURT PROPERLY CHARGED THE JURY WITH
THE ELEMENTS OF DISORDERLY CONDUCT

Jury Instruction number 3 upon Appellant's timely
objection was amended by the Court to delete that portion
that dealt with obscene gestures to conform with the evidence (T. 155 In 18-21) and the jury was left to decide the
issue (T* 156 In 15-16).
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Utah
Code Annotated (1953 as amended) §77-35-4 provides that an
information shall set forth the offense "by using the name
given to the offense by common law or by statutes by stating
in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to
give the defendant notice of the charge".
Any error that may have occurred by surplus verbage
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from the ordinance contained in the instruction was harmless
error.

See cases on harmless error set forth in Point 5,

below.
There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could
have found the Defendant guilty of disorderly conduct.
There was a face-to-face confrontation with Appellant
yelling and shouting "fuck you", "bullshit", "Goddamn",
"Hell" and "piss me off" at the officer.

The officer was

backing up to diffuse the situation (T. 92-100).

As officer

Monroe testified, it was becoming violent and he believed
there was going to be a fight (T. 84 In 9-12)

5
COURT PROPERLY ADMONISHED APPELLANT NOT TO
MAKE GESTURES IN THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY

In the present case, the following exchange took place
(T.61 In 8 to 62 In 5 ) :

"Mr. Huber:

I'm having a hard time swallowing
this

Mr. Brady:

Maybe he needs a drink.

The Court:

Well, I realize that, but I'm
admonishing you, Mr. Huber, to not
make any gestures in the presence
of this jury.

OQ

Mr. Huber:

Okay.

I'm sorry, your Honor

The Court:

You'll have your chance to testify
when your turn comes, and I don't
want you to shake your head one way
or another. Just sit there and
listen to the—

Mr. Lauritzen: Well, I object to that, your Honor.
He can certainly do that, that's
not testimony.
The Court:

He's not going to do it in my
Court, Mr. Lauritzen I want you to
understand that.

Mr. Lauritzen: Well, I continue my objection,
because I can't believe—
The Court:

You may have your objection.

You

may proceed.
Mr. Lauritzen: Thank You."
Any prejudice that may have occurred was due to Appellant's own gestures and words, "I'm having a hard time
swallowing this," not the action of the Court nor the
prosecutor.

In order to assure a fair trial, the Court

propertly admonished the Appellant not to make any more
gestures in the presence of the Jury.
If any error occurred by such admonition, it was
corrected by Jury Instruction 14 providing as follows:
If during the trial the Court has said
or done anything which has suggested to
you that it is inclined to favor the
claims or position of either party, you
will not permit yourselves to be
influenced by any such suggestion.

The Court has not intended to
indicate any opinion as to which witnesses are, or are not, worthy of
belief, nor which party should prevail.
If any expression has seemed to indicate
an opinion relating to any of these
matters, you should disregard it,
because you are the exclusive judges of
the facts.
At the very most, said admonition was harmless error.

Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Section
77-35-30 (a) provides " (a)ny error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a
party shall be disregarded.
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, (Utah 1987), the Utah
Supreme Court stated,
(W)e have ruled in several cases that
Rule 30 phrase "affect the substnatial
rights of a party" means that an error
warrants reversal "only if a review of
the record persuades the Court that
without the error there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
result for the defendant.1" Id. at 919.
The Utah Supreme Court further defined what is meant by
a "reasonable likelihood."

"For an error to require re-

versal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict."
Id. at 920.

This is a case of face-to-face confrontation

with Appellant yelling and shouting "Fuck you", "Bullshit",
"Goddamn", "Hell" and "Piss me off" at an officer.

The

officer backed up to diffuse the situation (T. 97-100).

The

situation was becoming violent and a fight was imminent (T.
84 In 9-12).
Remember, also, the jury found Appellant not guilty of
speeding (T. 192 In 7-9).

CONCLUSION

The Logan City Disorderly Conduct ordinance should be
construed as not violative of freedom of speech protections
of the Utah Constitution and United States Constitution.
Furthermore, the ordinance has been constitutionally applied
to Appellant under the facts of this case and therefore,
Appellantfs conviction should be affirmed.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/7

day of July, 1989.

A D D E N D U M

12-8-9.

Disorderly Conduct.

(a)

A Person is guilty

of disorderly conduct if:
(1)

He refuses to comply with the lawful order of the

police to move from a public place, or knowingly creates a
hazardous or physically offensive condition, by any act
which serves no legitimate purpose; or
(2)

Intending to cause public inconvenience,
annoyance, or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk
thereof:

(A)

He engages in fighting or in violent, tumultuous,
or threatening behavior; or

(B)

He makes unreasonable noises in a public place; or

(C)

He makes unreasonable noises in a private place
which can be heard in a public place; or

(D)

He engages in abusive or obscene language or makes
obscene gestures in a public place; or

(E)

He obstructs vehicular or pedestrian traffic.
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